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SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION: There is a worldwide increase in the number of invasive aesthetic procedures, and there is a general apprehension in 
medical societies towards the assurance of patient safety, that is dependent on the quality and certification of providers, of the mate-
rials and substances used, and where they take place.
It is the main objective of this study to determine the perception of the gravity of non-authorized substances for clinical use in invasive 
aesthetic procedures among Portuguese plastic surgeons and its variation by the clinical sector of practice.
METHODS: We proceeded to an inquiry by using a questionnaire, measured in a Linkert scale, and the collected data were statistically 
treated with a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test.
RESULTS: We obtained a 41,4% answer rate and a global perception that this is a serious problem – a median of 8,00 and mean of 7,45 
points on a 1 to 10 scale. 70% of the plastic surgeons that answered the questionnaire work both in the private and public sector, 19% 
exclusively in the public sector and 11% only in private practice. The perception of the problem was most serious among those that work 
exclusively in the private sector (statistically significant difference).
CONCLUSION: The causes of the observed difference may reside in various reasons: the higher number of patients submitted to invasive 
aesthetic procedures exclusively in private practice; the higher perception of regulatory deficits in the private sector; scarce specific 
health politics for procedures outside the traditional boundaries of medicine; the difficulty for independent regulatory agencies to adopt 
effective measures.
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ing scale with 10 points, limited at the extremities 
— lower extremity: “completely disagree”; upper ex-
tremity: “agree completely.”
The absence of normality in the distribution of 
levels obtained for the latent variable did not allow 
for the use of the Shapiro-Wilk test to determine the 
statistical relationships existing in the sample data. 
Therefore, it was necessary to use the Kruskal-Wal-
lis non-parametric test2,3which allowed for the statis-
tical analysis of the data. The statistical tests used 
0.05 (5.00%) as a reference significance level.
RESULTS
Of the 53 observations, the majority (70%) cor-
responds to mixed work regimen (accumulation of 
functions), 19% are from the public sector exclusively 
and 11% from the private sector exclusively (Table 1).
The average of total value is 7.45 and the medi-
an, 8.00 in a Likert scale (1 to 10), reflecting a wide-
spread perception that the problem of unauthorized 
substances for clinical use in aesthetic procedures 
is a serious one. The values obtained for the medi-
ans (and averages) of the seriousness of the problem, 
per sector of activity, are presented in Chart 1. This 
perception of the severity stands out on private sec-
tor category, with a median of 10.00 points (average 
of 9.33), i.e., 2.00 points above the value of the total 
median (1.88 point above the global average), while 
the categories that involve the public sector have 
lower scores — a median of 8.50 points (1.88 point 
above the global median) an average of 8.20 points 
(0.75 point above the global average) in the catego-
ry of public sector alone; and median of 7.00 points 
(1.00 point below the global median) and an average 
of 6.95 points (0.50 point below the global average) 
in the mixed category with roles in the public and 
private sectors.
INTRODUCTION
All around the world, worrisome reports of inva-
sive procedures performed outside of health insti-
tutions — in business centers, hair salons, beauty 
salons, private houses, social gatherings, parties, 
etc. —  have been surfacing. The risks of invasive 
procedures outside the clinical context are multi-
ple: inadequate selection of patients, peer pressure 
to consent to treatment, professionals who are not 
qualified to perform the procedures or unable to con-
trol/treat possible complications, ineffective quality 
control, storage and dosage of substances adminis-
tered, weak follow-up of patients in the period after 
the treatment, the possibility of alcohol and other 
substances being mixed with analgesic medication, 
among others1.
To our knowledge, there are no published stud-
ies on the regulation of invasive aesthetic procedures 
in Portugal, on the number of treatments that are 
performed outside the clinical context, or about the 
impact they have on the health of patients. The real 
dimension of the problem of aesthetic procedures 
performed outside the clinical context and its direct 
impact on the health of patients is very difficult to 
determine with accuracy, since they are not, in their 
majority, reported to authorities or to the medical 
and scientific communities. You can infer, however, 
the seriousness of the matter through the perception 
of professionals who legally carry out these proce-
dures and treat the complications derived from bad 
practices by others, and the regulatory mechanisms 
in relation to this specific issue.
METHODS
We used a survey by questionnaire as the em-
pirical instrument of data collection for this study. 
The total universe of plastic surgeons who are active 
members of the Portuguese Society of Reconstruc-
tive and Aesthetic Plastic Surgery that were surveyed 
(128), resulted in 53 responses considered valid for 
the characterizing variable of “area of exercise of the 
professional activity,” determining a response rate 
of 41.4%. For the characterization of this variable, we 
used the following categories: “public sector alone”; 
“private sector alone”; “public and private sectors.”
The latent variable used was the perception that 
the use of devices or substances not authorized for 
clinical use, in aesthetic procedures, is a serious 
problem; this was measured using the Likert rat-
TABLE 1. NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS PER SECTOR OF 
ACTIVITY AND ITS PERCENTAGE WEIGHT
Your clinical practice belongs 





Private sector alone 6 11.3
Public sector alone 10 18.9
Private and public sectors 37 69.8
Total 53 100
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It is necessary to determine whether these differ-
ences are statistically significant or may be due to 
random fluctuations in the data. Once it was deter-
mined that the distribution of scores was not normal 
using the Shapiro-Wilk test (p-value < 0.05), as de-
scribed in Table 2, it was necessary to use the Krus-
kal-Wallis non-parametric test.
Examples of the use of this test can be found in 
other articles published in the scientific literature3-6.
In Table 3 we can see that the p-value of 0.047 ob-
tained from this test is below the level of significance 
(0.05). 
From the results obtained by the comparison be-
tween the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test, through 
the stepwise method applied to the middle ranking 
of each sector of activity, it is possible to assume the 
existence of two subgroups of plastic surgeons: one 
that works exclusively in the private sector (with a 
higher value for the severity perception of the use of 
unauthorized substances in aesthetic procedures), 
and another which encompasses the public sector 
exclusively and the combination of public and private 
sectors (with lower perception values). 
These facts lead to rejection of the null hypothe-
sis of the test and the acceptance of the alternative 
hypothesis, which attests to the existence of statis-
tically significant differences in the median of the 
perception of plastic surgeons on the seriousness of 
the use of substances not authorized for clinical use 
in invasive aesthetic procedures varying according to 
the sector of activity. Therefore, this perception is not 
uniform, and the relationship between it and the sec-
tor of activity is statistically confirmed by these data: 
the medians of scores of the private sector alone are 
higher than those that involve the public sector.
DISCUSSION
Iatrogenic lesions in plastic surgery caused by 
substances not suitable for clinical use are well 
TABLE 2. SHAPIRO-WILK TEST APPLIED TO THE MEDIANS OF THE 
SCORES OF EACH SECTOR OF ACTIVITY (P-VALUE 0.05)




I believe that, in Portugal, the 
use of devices or substances 
not authorized for clinical use 
in aesthetic procedures is a 
serious problem.
Private sector alone 0.640 6 0.001
Public sector alone 0.832 10 0.035
Private and public sectors 0.898 37 0.003
TABLE 3. KRUSKAL-WALLIS TEST, WITH 
VARIABLE GROUPED PER “SECTOR OF ACTIVITY”
I believe that, in Portugal, the use of 
devices or substances not authorized 
for clinical use in aesthetic proce-













CHART 1. PERCEPTION VALUES OF THE GRAVITY OF THE USE OF SUBSTANCES NOT AUTHORIZED FOR CLINICAL 
USE IN AESTHETIC PROCEDURES PER SECTOR OF ACTIVITY
FRADINHO, N. C. L AND CORREIA, P.M.A.R
413 REV ASSOC MED BRAS 2019; 65(3):410-418
known, and there are cases described in which in-
dustrial silicone, liquid paraffin, soy oil, among oth-
ers were used7. After the Second World War, this 
type of experimentation was frequent8, but progres-
sively its use was restricted and regulated. In recent 
years, there has been a growing number of aesthet-
ic procedures at a global level: in 2015 more than 21 
million surgical and non-surgical procedures were 
performed (an increase of 1 million since 2014); the 
application of botulinum toxin (the most frequently 
used) and the infiltration of hyaluronic acid had an 
increase of 4% and 7% compared to the previous year, 
respectively9. This boom in demand for aesthetic pro-
cedures seems to be followed by a growth in irregu-
lar situations. The widespread perception among the 
plastic surgeons who responded to the survey is that 
the use of substances or devices not approved for 
clinical use in aesthetic procedures is a serious prob-
lem, with a median of 8 points (average of 7.45) on a 
scale of 1 to 10. However, there is a statistically sig-
nificant difference between the perception of plastic 
surgeons who work exclusively in the private sector 
and those who work in the public sector (exclusively 
or in a combination of roles). This difference may be 
due to:
• a greater number of patients who undergo this 
type of procedures conducted by plastic sur-
geons who devote their entire activity to the pri-
vate sector, since these patients attend, almost 
exclusively, private institutions (except for ma-
jor complications that require hospitalization). 
Consequently, they see a higher number of 
complications caused by the use of unautho-
rized substances used by others, which causes 
greater apprehension.
The work in private institutions alone has a differ-
ent administrative paradigm from that of the public 
sector, which is more exposed to possible failures in 
the regulatory mechanisms of the professional activ-
ity and of the substances administered.
According to a survey conducted by the SPCPRE 
with its members and presented at the III Iberian 
Congress of Plastic Surgery (2016), half of the plastic 
surgeons recently observed patients that underwent 
implantation of devices or substances not authorized 
for clinical use10. This observation reflects a worry-
ing reality for citizens’ health and may be related to 
several factors. There are procedures that are not 
performed by qualified professionals, which can fa-
cilitate circumvention of the regulatory mechanisms 
and stimulate the unscrupulous use of appropriate 
substances; patients may not be adequately informed 
about the type of procedures, the substances used, 
and the qualifications of those who will practice inva-
sive aesthetic procedures11; and the regulatory mech-
anisms may not be keeping up with this phenome-
non, having difficulties with the effectiveness of their 
actions, because of:
The complexity inherent to certain specific is-
sues, and in particular aesthetics, which are com-
mon to other countries, irrespective of their political 
and administrative reality.
The existence of different ethical foundations of 
Anglo-Saxon and European countries, with practi-
cal implications determinants of different adminis-
trative processes and organizational models — the 
Anglo-Saxon management and pragmatics, based 
on the implementation of effective, preventive, and 
formative mechanisms, in opposition to the Europe-
an legalistic and conceptual model, with is repairing 
and far from the “practice”12.
Cultural differences — beliefs and values of pub-
lic administration, which are in conflict with this in-
creasingly mixed model.
The relative lack of experience in this type of inde-
pendence of regulatory agencies under the unifying 
State. There are similarities between the public and 
private administration in the Anglo-Saxon model, 
and the administrative process is seen as a means for 
achieving goals, with obvious gains in effectiveness 
and efficiency (instrumentalist); this model contrasts 
with the Continental European model, which sees 
the public and private administration as completely 
different spheres, with their own instruments —  re-
straining even the public administration in a sepa-
rate code of rules and legislative system, with few 
points of contact with the general law. Comparative-
ly, the Anglo-Saxon approach there are similarities in 
the administrative functions of the public and private 
sector, differing mainly on strategic issues, while in 
the Continental European approach the similarities 
are avoided and the public administration is based on 
principles necessarily different from those adopted 
in private administration, very dependent on legal/
normative regulations12.
Aesthetic procedures introduce bodily chang-
es with the aim of improving physical appearance 
and, consequently, increasing self-esteem. Some are 
not considered healthcare in Portugal (manicure, 
mechanical epilation, tattoos, for example) and are 
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performed in beauty and hair salons, for example, 
without the need for regulation of the provider. In 
the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the majority 
of these activities is seen as “health” activities and 
are regulated by the Ministry of Health. The already 
historically fluid boundaries between hygiene, medi-
cine, and beauty are undefined when it comes to aes-
thetics.
The role of the State is also different in how it 
sees plastic surgery, depending on the type of pro-
cedure. Reconstructive plastic surgery procedures, 
as are included in the list of procedures offered by 
the National Health Service (SNS), inhabit the Con-
tinental European administrative paradigm with a 
strong presence of the State as provider, funder, and 
regulator and with a normative influence inherited 
from the French influence of the 18th and 19th cen-
turies by Bonnin13, based mainly on administrative 
law. Plastic surgery procedures, in its aesthetic as-
pect, are inserted in an open market, of private ser-
vices and free competition, and fall more into the 
Anglo-Saxon paradigm typical of private providers 
of health care, in which the State retains only the 
role of regulator. This role of attentive spectator-in-
tervener, in an open but regulated market, has long 
historical practice in common law countries, with a 
tradition and well-established mechanisms that have 
been refined over time14. In Portugal, there has been 
a gradual importation of management measures in 
public administration since the years 1980-1990 — 
New Public Management — with a greater increment 
in the period of financial rescues in the 1980s (mainly 
by the influence of the International Monetary Fund) 
and, more recently, in the troika intervention. De-
spite political and historical-institutional differenc-
es15, as part of this package of measures independent 
regulatory institutions were created in various sec-
tors. The need to regulate a market arises when one 
of the following assumptions is present: monopolies, 
externalities, asymmetric information, the need for 
continuity of service, anticompetitive behavior, the 
existence of a public good, when the bargaining pow-
er is unequal, if there is a shortage of resources and/
or need of rationing, or due to a need for planning16. 
The public good identified, in the case of aesthetic 
procedures, is not only the direct result of the actions 
(improvement of the physical appearance or delay of 
the effects of aging) but the preservation of the secu-
rity of these actions, i.e., mitigating or minimizing 
the health risk of these procedures. We can infer, 
then, that health or, more specifically, the mainte-
nance of the health state in aesthetic procedures is 
also regarded as a public good.
The Law framework of independent adminis-
trative entities with regulation functions stipulates 
that “the regulation entities are collective persons of 
public law, with the nature of independent adminis-
trative entities with attributions in the field of regu-
lation of economic activity, protection of services of 
general interest, protection of the rights and inter-
ests of consumers, and promotion defense of com-
petition in private, public, social and cooperative 
sectors”17. In this way, the transition from the sepa-
ration of State and market economy establishes a so-
cial value to the public regulation ensuring equality 
of opportunity for competition and guarantying the 
obligations of public service of the various sectors 
of society. There is, therefore, an understanding of 
regulation as a new form of relationship between the 
State and society, creating additional social value, by 
means of norms that ensure the balanced function-
ing of the open system (market) in agreement with 
public objectives.
The tendency for the formation of independent 
administrative authorities have in common at least 
three characteristics: the recognition that regulation 
has a specific logic and should, whenever possible, 
be separated from the political logic; the recognition 
that the market has flaws and not always gives guar-
antees of finding the balance of the system for the 
fulfillment of their public obligations; the recognition 
that the State is also flawed due to its administrative 
burden, its causal guidelines, corporatism, among 
others, which restrict the public interest18.
In the health sector, these management modifica-
tions are mirrored in the plan of Reduction and Im-
provement of the Central Administration (Premac), 
considered by the tutelage as “[...] the beginning of 
a new phase of the reform of Public Administration, 
in order to make rational and efficient use of public 
resources. [...] Indeed, more than ever, the simul-
taneous achievement of the objectives of rational-
ization of state structures and better use of human 
resources is crucial in the process of modernization 
and optimization of the functioning of Public Admin-
istration”.19 This focus on the pursuit of efficiency 
and rationalization of resources was subsequently 
achieved by the creation of new independent ad-
ministrative bodies with powers of supervision and 
regulation, such as the General Inspection of Health 
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Activities (Igas), or the independence of already ex-
istent autonomous structures, such as the Health 
Regulatory Body (ERS). This was created in 2005, in 
the process of autonomizing the regulatory agencies 
— which was already a management measure part of 
the New Public Management.  
From the normative point of view, until recently 
the blurring of what is a health and a medical proce-
dure persisted. We found that the Portuguese legal 
system does not include a isolated definition of the 
medical procedure, but there is a reservation of exer-
cise on procedures of medical diagnosis, therapeutic 
prescription, and autonomous management of pa-
tients20. In addition to the difficulty in clarifying ex-
actly what is and what is not a medical procedure, or 
a procedure restricted to health professionals, there 
is a normative vacuum in the classification of what is 
an invasive procedure”. If one considers, on the one 
hand, that a tattoo, a body piercing, laser/pulsed light 
hair removal are invasive because they penetrate 
completely or partially the protective barrier of the 
skin, and because they can cause serious damage, 
temporary or permanent (transmission of diseases, 
hemorrhages, skin burns, eye injuries, among oth-
ers), in practice, they are often used by people with-
out any basic health training, performed solely based 
on “common sense”. The project for a legal definition 
of Health Procedure is restricted to eight professions, 
trying to refer to a specific procedure of each profes-
sional activity, but described in very general terms21. 
Within these professions, it is understood from the 
remaining national regulatory framework that “acts 
of medical diagnosis (unlike the nursing diagnosis), 
prescribing treatment (unlike the non-therapeutic 
prescription) and autonomous management of pa-
tients constitute acts of absolute exclusivity of the 
medical profession. [...] The other acts, functionally 
considered as acts of the medical profession, appear 
to be susceptible to being delegable to other health 
professionals, including nurses, upon authorization 
of the Order of Doctors and within limits defined by 
a initial medical prescription”20. 
The legislation itself that defines the competen-
cies of each entity with the power to regulate in the 
area of health has an overlapping of competences and 
their limits of action, which can induce the existence 
of “gray areas” that are the legal responsibility of sev-
eral entities, but which, in practice, are not super-
vised by none. Perhaps to overcome some of these 
shortcomings, a protocol of cooperation between the 
ERS and the professional orders of the health sector 
was recently signed to “cooperate in the sharing of 
resources, both human and technical, and of knowl-
edge with the purpose of improving the exercise of 
their respective attributions” and provides for the 
participation of professional orders in the planning 
and execution of supervisory actions, surveys, moni-
toring, and periodic evaluations”22.
The Botulinum Toxin, for example, authorized 
by Infarmed for administration by “physicians ex-
TABLE 4. ENTITIES WITH RESPONSIBILITY IN THE REGULATION IN THE HEALTH AREA AND THEIR POWERS
Health Regulatory 
Entity
Regulates and inspects only the institutions registered as providers of health care — clinics, private clinics, hospitals 
— and has no powers of supervision of certification of the provider and of the quality of most substances and devices 
used in aesthetic procedures. However, it is stipulated that its influence extends to “any other places where it is materi-
ally identified the practice of activities that integrate the concept of health care provision, as defined by the ERS”35. 
General supervision 
of health activities
Its mission is to audit, inspect, supervise and develop disciplinary action in the health sector in order to ensure com-
pliance with the law and high technical levels of performance in all areas of activity and the provision of health care 
through services, establishments and bodies of the Ministry of Health [...], or protected by it, either by private entities, 
collective persons, profit or non-profit”. This agency has the power to “supervise the compliance with legal provisions 
and regulations and the applicable guidelines, as well as the quality of services rendered by any entity or professional 
in the field of health activities, through the implementation of actions of audit, i, spection and supervision”; and to 
carry out regular services of inspection at the level of safety and quality, in conjunction with the General Directorate of 
Health (DGS)”19.
Infarmed Has the mission to “contribute to the formulation of national health policies”, “regulate, evaluate, authorize, punish, 
supervise, check analytically, and ensure the monitoring and control of research, production, distribution, marketing 
and use of medicinal products for human use and health products, which includes medical devices and cosmetics and 
personal hygiene products,” as well as “ensure the regulation and supervision of the activities of research, production, 
distribution, marketing and use” of these products and devices36.
Order of Doctors Has the powers to regulate the access and the exercise of the profession of physician and exercise disciplinary power 
over them: its code of ethics provides disciplinary sto doctors  doctors who go beyond the limits of their powers, taking 
into account the specialties and subspecialties —  usually after complaint37. Should collaborate with other entities of 
the Public Administration in matters of public interest related to the medical profession and contribute to the protec-
tion of the health of citizens and the rights of patients, as well as participate in the drafting of legislation which relates 
to the access to and pursuit of the medical profession38.
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perienced in the application of botulinum toxin” (in-
formative leaflet), is sold only with a prescription. 
However, this type of medication in pharmacies is 
easily obtained for application by non-doctors, and 
there is not a mandatory registration of the pre-
scriber per package. In Spain, for example, the gov-
ernment has made some progress in regulating this 
type of procedures through the control of the circuit 
of the active substances and the certification of the 
provider. The Botulinum Toxin used with aesthetic 
indication has the same regulation of medicines for 
hospital use and can only be administered by “phy-
sicians with the proper qualification, experience in 
the treatment, and with the appropriate equipment 
and instrumentation. As a result, and to ensure that 
the proper administration of these treatments can 
only be performed in hospitals or health care insti-
tutions that are duly authorized in accordance with 
the legislation in force”23. The transport, storage, and 
recording of packages follow the same requirements 
of medicines for hospital use only. There is also a re-
quirement that the doctor fills out a standard sheet 
with the reference of the packaging, the date, and the 
dose of administration, for reporting to the health au-
thority, as well as an informational letter for patients 
who will receive the medication for the first time, 
containing the goals of the treatment, an explanation 
of the procedure and the risks involved.
Subcutaneous fillers to gain volume are also con-
sidered medical devices for exclusive medical use, 
but there is little control of their use. There are also 
reported cases of fraud and counterfeiting of facial 
filler products based on hyaluronic acid24. With glo-
balization and the expansion of the digital commerce, 
nowadays it is easier to bypass regulating agencies 
and order substances and devices, over the internet, 
that are released for “clinical use” and “without con-
trol by national and international medication agen-
cies.”
However, this problem is not confined to the na-
tional reality; it is an international phenomenon. 
Rufai and Davis believe that cosmetic surgery in the 
United Kingdom is also “ubiquitous, unregulated, 
and seductive,” there is no great adherence to na-
tional guidelines25. The lack of control over the qual-
ification of suppliers may be a predisposing factor to 
the use of substances not authorized for clinical use. 
Then, the question that arises is: who has the qual-
ifications to provide this type of care?26 The use of 
training programs, the regulation of sectors, profes-
sional certification and the constant and systematic 
evaluation along the professional career are contem-
porary manifestations of the logic of scientific man-
agement. The desire of societies for certification, ac-
curacy, organization and appropriate categorization 
of the world to find a sense in it is, without a doubt, 
as strong today as it was at the foundation of scientif-
ic management27, and is compatible with the need for 
control and security of citizens themselves. 
In the USA, the most important factor for patients 
in choosing a provider of aesthetic procedures is the 
certification in plastic surgery28,29, and the greatest 
fear is to obtain “bad results”30. Even so, many of the 
providers of aesthetic procedures in the country are 
not certified by the American Society of Plastic Sur-
geons (ASPS)31 or by other medical societies. A grow-
ing phenomenon is also the emergence of inaccurate 
qualifications that do not correspond to any type of 
degree or certification — “aesthetic surgeon”, “aes-
thetic doctor”, “facial plastic surgeon”, “cosmetic 
surgeon”, as a way to disguise the absence of a cer-
tification recognized by the national medical associ-
ations. Usually, the provider with this type of (self)
qualification is a general medical practitioner or has 
another specialization less “seductive” for aesthetic 
procedures, or is a non-medical healthcare profes-
sional, or even someone without any qualification in 
health care provision. This type of marketing maneu-
ver is frequent and is also observed abroad, with sev-
eral calls for government intervention.26,32. 
In Portugal, the regulation of advertising of health 
procedures has recently been legislated as an attri-
bution of the ERS and, in this context, it is deemed 
to be unlawful if it induces the patient to procedures 
that are unnecessary, harmful or without prior diag-
nosis or evaluation by a “qualified professional”; and 
“every time the professional favored by the practice 
of health advertising is also the health care provid-
er, without actually being one, or if they are a health 
care provider but do not comply with the require-
ments of activity and operation, are not duly regis-
tered with the regulatory body of health and do not 
hold a license of operation, when applicable” .33
Recently, there has been a controversial attempt 
to regulate the activity of beauty salons by the Eu-
ropean Committee for Standardization (CEN). About 
two years ago, the organization gathered a group of 
experts for the development of the CEN-409 norma-
tive for beauty salons34. This project was withdrawn 
in 2016 due to numerous complaints from local com-
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mittees and national entities related to health, due to 
the possible ethical commitment to the safety of pa-
tients if the law were approved. On the basis of these 
allegations was the type of procedures that could be 
performed in “beauty salons” or equivalent, such as 
laser treatments, IPL, mesotherapy, ultrasounds, ra-
diofrequency, chemical peels, without restrictive cri-
teria of power, penetration, and depth, for example. 
According to the entities that complained about the 
normative proposal, these invasive aesthetic proce-
dures should be performed by physicians or under 
the supervision of one, based on a clinical diagnosis, 
and in institutions properly regulated and super-
vised.
In practice, there seems to be a lack of supervi-
sion of economic activities not registered as health 
establishments based on clinical criteria — including 
“aesthetic centers”, hair salons and beauty salons. 
There seems to be only, in practice, control of the ac-
tivity in terms of quality of infrastructures, security, 
and tax transparency by means of the Economic and 
Food Safety Authority (ASAE).
CONCLUSION
Although the entities with the power to regulate 
the health sector have responsibilities defined by law 
to act on the various market segments of aesthetics 
— with an overlapping of functions — and have the 
duty to cooperate among themselves, there is a wide-
spread perception among plastic surgeons who are 
accredited providers that the use of substances not 
authorized for clinical use in invasive aesthetic pro-
cedures is a serious problem. This perception is more 
pronounced in surgeons who exercise their activity 
exclusively in the private sector. 
The regulation of the various segments that con-
stitute the circuit of these substances — production, 
marketing, distribution, utilization, monitoring, in-
spection, evaluation — by agencies that are still in-
corporating instruments of independent or autono-
mous action, imported from countries with different 
administrative histories and cultures (management), 
may not prove to be effective in a real level, with the 
aggravating circumstance that this market also finds 
difficulties of effective regulation at an international 
level. The fact that this is a recent problem at a global 
scale has not yet allowed for the creation of specific 
health policies and effective administrative solutions.
Greater supervision and transparency are neces-
sary in order to increase the safety of patients and 
the reliability of results26.
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RESUMO
INTRODUÇÃO: Os procedimentos estéticos invasivos estão a aumentar globalmente, e são acompanhados por uma apreensão das so-
ciedades médicas sobre a segurança desses procedimentos, dependentes da qualidade e certificação dos prestadores, dos dispositivos e 
substâncias utilizados e do local onde são efetuados. O presente estudo procura aferir a percepção dos cirurgiões plásticos portugueses 
sobre a gravidade da utilização de substâncias não autorizadas para uso clínico em procedimentos estéticos, e a sua variação conso-
ante o setor em que exercem a atividade clínica. 
MÉTODOS: Foi utilizado um inquérito sob a forma de questionário, medido numa escala de Likert, e os dados foram tratados estatisti-
camente pelo teste não paramétrico de Kruskal-Wallis. 
RESULTADOS: Obteve-se uma taxa de resposta de 41,4% e a perceção global é a de que o problema é grave — mediana de 8,00 e média 
de 7,45 numa escala de 1 a 10. Setenta por cento dos cirurgiões plásticos que responderam ao inquérito trabalham num regime misto, 
19% exclusivamente no setor público e 11% apenas no setor privado. A percepção do problema como mais grave (diferença estatistica-
mente significativa) foi observada na atividade exclusiva no setor privado.
CONCLUSÕES: A diferença observada pode dever-se a vários fatores: à maior observação de pacientes submetidos a esses procedi-
mentos exclusivamente no setor privado; à maior percepção de déficits de regulação no setor privado; ao déficit de políticas de saúde 
específicas a técnicas utilizadas fora do contexto tradicional da medicina; à dificuldade de as agências administrativas reguladoras 
independentes adotarem práticas efetivas no setor privado da saúde.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Regulamentação governamental. Legislação de dispositivos médicos. Estética. Certificação. Cirurgia plástica.
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